Wanted - A Coalition Leader

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Given the substantial ‘blood and treasure’ the United States has invested in Afghanistan it is unsurprising that the war there is viewed by many Americans as ‘America’s War’.  However, it would be regrettable if this perspective were to guide the White House’s handling of the conflict.  For if President Obama and his Administration do not assimilate that the war in Afghanistan is a coalition effort and lead it accordingly, the endeavour will fail.

The annoyance Americans feel about the unwillingness of many coalition nations (mostly European) to fight the insurgents and shed blood in Afghanistan is understandable, but if America is going to steer the international intervention in Afghanistan to a successful conclusion it must show the maturity to master such frustration and accommodate differences in commitment.  Adopting an overbearing approach of ‘follow me and do as I do or I will get annoyed’ simply will not work.

Unpalatable as it may be, the enormous military intervention in Afghanistan is a UN-mandated, NATO-led mission comprising nearly 50 nations.  Whilst it may be tempting to contemptuously dismiss those nations in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which are reluctant to conduct offensive operations their contributions remain of value.  Indeed, Washington should reflect on how it would back-fill the security gaps which would appear across Afghanistan if their 25-30 percent contribution to the 41,000 non-US troops in ISAF left the country.

More importantly, how would such a fracture of the coalition effect the insurgents?  The irksome truth is that Washington must preserve coalition unity or risk subverting its own efforts in Afghanistan.  That is not to suggest that the White House should not seek greater commitment from nations who could do more, but it must do so with greater sensitivity, shrewdly, and with patience.  Despite the disparity in ISAF commitment, Washington must lead as primus inter pares. 

Consider, for example, the dismissal of General McChrystal.  He was the commander of a fourty-plus nation allied force but the opinions of the coalition were not evident in his removal.  Given a vote, it seems highly likely that coalition states would have supported the commander who had personally gripped ISAF’s fortunes, provided clear intent and created a momentum of progress across the coalition.  Doubtless, the allies would have forgiven his astonishing indiscretion for the sake of progress on the ground in Afghanistan, but from a purely national perspective the White House could not.  Nor did it choose to use the coalition ‘card’ as a (justifiable) excuse to severely admonish the General but leave him in situ.  That may prove to have been a lost opportunity.

Naturally, as US casualty figures continue to rise the perception that only America is ‘pulling its weight’ in Afghanistan will grow in US circles.  Yet a simple focus on the total number of casualties a nation suffers ignores the fact that smaller national contingents may be enduring a greater proportional burden, and as the information at icasualties.org illustrates, approximately 39 percent of coalition casualties in Afghanistan since 2001 have not been American.  The assertion (trumpeted in the Rolling Stone article that ruined General McChrystal) that the conflict in Afghanistan is exclusively a US war is an affront to the dead, maimed and wounded citizens from over 20 coalition partner nations whose sacrifice has mirrored that of their American brothers in arms.

The US can produce a successful result in Afghanistan, but it cannot do so alone.  Worryingly, it is not clear that the Administration in Washington understands that or indeed wants to.  On the surface, public remarks may suggest a cooperative approach to the mission in Afghanistan but behind closed doors important decisions appear to be made with parochial, not collegiate, priorities in view.  Should President Obama be tempted to use the war in Afghanistan as a means of making domestic capital he should remember that he does so at the possible expense of a great many foreigners.  Of course, political leaders in other coalition nations will also view Afghanistan with one eye on their domestic popularity but none of them do so with so great a hand on the coalition tiller.

For all his undoubted skill in reinvigorating and directing the counter-insurgency campaign perhaps General McChrystal was so focused on addressing problems within Afghanistan that he paid insufficient attention to the needs of the coalition’s ‘Home Front’.  If there is a silver lining to the cloud that saw him forfeit his command of ISAF it might be that General Petraeus may pay more regard to the coalition dimension of the endeavour.  For it would be a travesty if after the expenditure of so much ISAF ‘blood and treasure‘ the progress now being achieved in Afghanistan was undermined by a collapse of support amongst the populations of coalition nations.

 ISAF cannot not win in-theater if it loses at home.  Having experienced that situation a generation ago, of all the coalition nations it is the US which should understand this danger best.  Today it must appreciate that as well as managing public opinion in America, it must be mindful of opinions in a host of other nations too.  This adds complexity to the leadership challenges America must shoulder, and it will create conflicts of interest between the US and other coalition partners.  Leading a coalition such as that in Afghanistan demands a rare maturity.  ISAF needs steering not driving, persuading not berating and exhortation not extortion.  It needs a captain not a dictator.  For the sake of all those Afghan, coalition and US citizens affected by the war let us hope that the current US Administration has the statesmanship, wisdom, humility and fraternity to lead more than ‘Team America’.

Contributor: Paul Smyth

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Paul Smyth has a 30-year career profile spanning a rare mix of military and think-tank employment.  His experience encompasses crisis management, planning expertise, performance setting and assessment, operational and combat experience, research and analysis, strategic liaison, international collaboration and media commentary.  He is currently the owner of R3I Consulting (http://www.r3iconsulting.com/)

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Report Abuse   outlawdba 07/28/2010 9:19:19 PM EDT For the sake of all those Afghan, coalition and US citizens affected by the war let us hope that the current US Administration has the statesmanship, wisdom, humility and fraternity to lead more than ‘Team America’. Absolutely true and great point yet difficult (although not impossible) to recover from prior 8 years of gross mismanagement. This was the full scope of the prior administrations foreign policy: The annoyance Americans feel about the unwillingness of many coalition nations (mostly European) to fight the insurgents and shed blood in Afghanistan is understandable, but if America is going to steer the international intervention in Afghanistan to a successful conclusion it must show the maturity to master such frustration and accommodate differences in commitment. Adopting an overbearing approach of ‘follow me and do as I do or I will get annoyed’ simply will not work. Again, difficult but not impossible to turn that momentum even if Obama has the correct intentions. Even more difficult, still, is to overcome that former mindset that surely predominates some of the most influential members of the American military industrial complex leadership. A bad/trite analogy: difficult to turn a union shop to a non-union organization/culture. One would assume changing the strategy/philosophy/culture of how the Afghanistan coalition can/will successfully win the war is significantly more complex. There are those glory stories of the turn-around CEO types (more from the 80s than the present-day Fortune 500 America) yet even in those cases it often took several "turn-around" experts before an effective, successful CEO filled the role and completed the job. Again, one would have to assume the Washington politics, having the full momentum of the prior administration, could take years to reverse if it's possible, whatsoever. Again, you make a very good point and it is very unfortunate the war wasn't managed/waged that way from the very beginning. Replies (0) Post a reply Sign in or Sign up to post a comment